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Abstract 
 
Capital markets perform two distinct functions: provision of capital and facilitation of 
good governance through information production and monitoring. I argue that the 
governance function has more impact on the efficiency with which resources are utilized 
within the firm.  Based on industry level data across thirty-eight countries, I present 
evidence suggesting a positive relation between market-based governance and 
improvements in industry efficiency. The measures of governance are also positively 
correlated with productivity improvements and growth in real output. Furthermore, while 
governance affects efficiency, the capital provision services induce technological change. 
The evidence underscores the role of capital markets as a conduit of socially valuable 
governance services as distinct from capital provision. 
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   1 
I.     Introduction 
Why do we observe differences in economic performance among countries; across 
industries in the same economy; and across firms belonging to the same industry?   What could be 
the role of the financial system in explaining cross-country and cross-industry variations in 
economic performance?   While determinants of cross-country economic growth have been of great 
interest to development economists and growth economic theory, the role of financial markets and 
institutions has traditionally received very little attention. Recent finance literature reports strong 
relations between indicators of financial development and economic performance in the real sector, 
indicating a positive role for capital markets and institutions (see, e.g., Levine (1998), Levine and 
Zervos (1998); and Rajan and Zingales (1998)).  Levine and Zervos (1998), for example, find a 
strong correlation between financial development, and growth in per capita GDP and productivity. 
Yet, despite such progress in exploring the finance-growth nexus, we are far from understanding the 
exact mechanisms through which the financial system could affect economic performance in the 
real sector.  As Zingales (2003) notes, this lack of understanding has been one of the reasons why it 
has been so difficult to draw policy conclusions from the finance-growth literature.  Identifying the 
channels of influence is also important for instilling confidence in the documented first-order 
relations between finance and growth by strengthening the argument for causality running from the 
financial to the real sector. 
  In this study, I utilize a corporate finance framework to investigate empirically the finance-
growth link by examining possible channels through which financial market functions could 
influence economic performance at industry level. I begin from a premise that financial markets and 
institutions play two critical roles in an economy: allocation of risk capital through saving 
mobilization and risk-pooling and sharing; and promotion of responsible governance and control   2 
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through providing outside investors a variety of mechanisms for monitoring inside decision makers. 
In its allocation function, the financial system helps transfer resources from individual savers to 
agents with managerial and entrepreneurial talents with investment opportunities and provides firms 
and investors risk-pooling and sharing facilities.  As its governance function, it provides monitoring 
and information production services by which it helps mitigate the various agency problems of the 
firm resulting in better project evaluation and selection even in the absence of external finance 
need.  While recognizing the twin roles of the financial system, modern corporate finance theory 
emphasizes the monitoring and information production function; in contrast, the recent finance-
growth literature focuses on the capital mobilization role.  Bridging the gap, I argue that the two 
functions systematically affect different sources of growth. 
  I postulate that economic performance in the real sector, for example, as measured by 
growth in output ( y & ), is partly a function of the effectiveness of the supporting financial system in 
delivering governance (G) and capital allocation (A) functions, 
(1) 
Part of the growth in output ( y & ) is attributable to a mere change in the use of constituent factors of 
production. The remaining is considered to be a result of growth in total factor productivity ( P F T & ), 
and generally, accounts for all changes in output not accounted by growth in production inputs. 
Denoting I &  to be growth in inputs. 
(2) 
The recent literature on the nexus between finance and growth explores the role of financial 
development in explaining variations in output growth ( y & ) and its componentsI & and  P F T & (see 
Levine (1997) and Levine (2003) for a review of this literature).  Country-level studies of Levine 
(1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998)), industry-level studies of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
firm-level studies such as Demerguc and Maksimovic (1998) confirm strong positive relation   3 
between overall financial development and output growth ( y & ). Levine and Zervos (1998) further 
documents that financial development is strongly correlated with productivity growth ( P F T & ), 
establishing the potential role of the financial system in explaining real performance. My paper 
complements and contributes to this literature by identifying the specific channels through which 
the financial system could affect economic performance via its twin functions of governance and 
allocation.  First, I break down productivity growth ( P F T & ) into two sources: efficiency 
improvements and technological change. I then extend the extant empirical evidence by showing 
how the allocation (A) and governance (G) functions of the financial system affect these primal 
sources of productivity.  Finally, instead of focusing on overall financial development and its 
relation to growth, I develop and focus on measures of how effectively financial systems deliver 
their twin functions of governance and allocation.  In so doing, I answer the following research 
questions: Through what productivity channels (i.e. efficiency or technological change) does the 
financial system affect growth?  Which capital market function, allocation versus governance, 
matters more for productivity growth?    
I find that both governance and allocation are significant determinants of output growth and 
productivity.  However, taken together, governance dominates allocation in its impact on 
productivity.  Furthermore, while governance works through the channel of improving efficiency to 
promote productivity growth, the allocation function appears to have more impact on the 
technological change component of productivity. The correlations between the measures of 
governance and efficiency, and the measures of allocation and technological change are robust to 
alternative model specification in which I use legal and institutional variables that are deemed to be 
more exogenous as instruments, indicating that the relations identified could be causal.  The 
empirical results are also robust to alternative definitions of the focal constructs of ‘efficiency’ and 
‘governance’, and alternative specifications of latent variables as random- or fixed-effects.   4 
The evidence, therefore, suggests the following: (1) the financial system positively affects 
growth and productivity via two channels: through improving efficiencies and through enabling 
technological inventions and innovations, (2) while the governance services of financial markets 
help induce improvements in efficiency, the allocation services help accelerate technological 
advances, and (3) while both governance and allocation are determinants of productivity, the impact 
of governance (via efficiency) dominates the impact of allocation (via technological change). 
The evidence underscores the role of particularly the equity market as a conduit of socially 
valuable governance services as distinct from capital provision. The value of this service is 
economically large.  An industry operating in a country with a stock market that is one standard 
deviation above the mean of the proxy for the governance function would have a growth rate of 
1.05 percent per annum in real output more than that for the average industry.  Cumulating over the 
sample period of 15 years, real output for such industry would have been about 17 percent higher at 
the end of study period. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides the theoretical framework 
and develops the hypotheses to be investigated.  I describe the data and methodology in Section III.  
Section IV and V examine the empirical relations between economic performance, focusing on 
sources of productivity, and capital market functions. Section VI summarizes the results with policy 
implications.     
II.     Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Corporate finance theory suggests that the link between finance and investment at the micro 
level is a consequence of contractual imperfections.  In fact, financial markets and institutions arise 
to mitigate problems of informational and transactional frictions.  To that end, financial markets and 
institutions perform various functions. They aggregate and mobilize capital, provide risk pooling   5 
and sharing services, assess and select projects and management through producing information, 
and monitor inside decision making.  These diverse services could be classified into two 
analytically separable functions: capital allocation and governance. The allocation function involves 
mobilizing savings from economic units with excess capital to individuals with entrepreneurial 
talents and with investment opportunities, as well as providing risk pooling and sharing 
opportunities. The governance function encompasses the role of financial systems in alleviating 
agency problems that arise among stakeholders in the firm.  
The degree to which the financial system influences economic performance in the real sector 
depends on how effectively it carries out both its allocation and governance functions. 
A.  Governance and Economic Performance: The Economic Efficiency Channel 
 
A primary function of financial markets is one of facilitating responsible governance within 
the firm.  In a world of uncertainty and incomplete contracting, problems of imperfect information 
and moral hazard may prevent the first-best value-maximizing investment behavior. Markets and 
institutions mitigate the consequences of imperfect information and moral hazard by producing 
information and facilitating monitoring. The effectiveness with which markets perform this 
governance function bears on firm’s economic efficiency in the sense that alleviation of the agency 
problems engenders convergence of the firm’s observed economic behavior to its optimum. 
Economic efficiency is broadly defined as the degree to which observed economic behavior 
converges to the optimal given the constraints of the underlying technology
1.   
As their vital role, financial markets process information (see, e.g., Grossman (1976)).  
Trading among market participants produces information that is conveyed through price signals. 
Information is also generated by financial institutions (see, e.g., Diamond (1984), and Leland and 
                                                           
1 Assuming cost minimization as a behavioral goal, for example, economic efficiency could be operationalized as observed total cost 
compared to the optimal given the level of output and input prices.   6 
Pyle (1977)). Instead of traders producing information through trading and conveying it via prices, 
banks hire loan officers who produce information while evaluating projects for loan financing.  
This ‘information production’ role has consequences that have efficiency implications.  
First, security prices formed in financial markets convey valuable information about the 
profitability of current investment opportunities and thereby guide managerial decision-making (see 
Dow and Gorton (1997), Bresnahaan, Milgrom and Paul (1992); and Titman and Subrahmanyam 
(1999)). Second, simply that based on the information, bad firms, management teams or projects do 
not get funding, preventing waste of resources.  In a nutshell, the information production function 
and firm economic efficiency are linked in that markets and institutions that generate better 
information enable firms to make better decisions.  
In addition to information production, markets and institutions facilitate monitoring of 
inside decision-makers in various ways. First, markets generate information to evaluate the quality 
of past managerial decisions (Kihlstrom and Matthews (1990)).  Second, information in stock prices 
allows effective managerial incentive schemes (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)).  Third, the threat of 
takeover via capital markets mitigates managerial inefficiencies (e.g. Scharfstein (1988)).  
These various forms of market-based monitoring directly enhance efficiency at the firm 
level.  Managerial incentives that use information in stock prices reduce shirking, leading to the 
alignment of managerial interest to that of shareholders.  Inefficient management gets forced out 
through the mechanism of the market for corporate control.  More importantly, the threat of 
takeover induces managerial discipline, preventing managerial actions that waste firm resources.  
B.  Allocation and Economic Performance: The Technological Change Channel 
A key function of financial institutions and markets is mobilizing capital to its efficient use - 
the Allocation function.  Financial systems aggregate small savings of numerous investors for use   7 
by agents with entrepreneurial talents who need funds for large-scale capital investments.  In so 
doing, they also provide investors as well as entrepreneurs with risk-pooling and sharing facilities.   
The availability of capital and the ability of investors to share risk influence the degree of 
risk tolerance and the choice of technologies in an economy.   Through easing the burden of risk to 
capital contributors and entrepreneurs, markets and institutions enable the undertaking of risky 
technological inventions and innovations.  This link between the allocation function and 
technological innovations takes many forms. First, adoption of technologies requires large sums of 
capital that could easily be mobilized in well-developed financial systems.  Second, well-developed 
capital markets and institutions encourage adoption of long-gestation productive technologies 
through reducing investors’ liquidity risks (Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995).  Finally, by 
providing hedging and other risk sharing possibilities, financial markets and institutions promote 
assimilation of specialized (versus generalized), thus risky and yet productive, technologies (see, 
e.g., Saint-Paul (1992)).  The implication is that, other things constant, countries with mature 
banking sector and capital markets should achieve higher rates of technological change.  This, in 
turn, translates into higher productivity and, therefore, to larger economic growth. 
   To sum up, how does the financial system affect real economic performance?  I argue, as in 
equation (1) above, that how better off an economic unit will be, as measured by growth in output 
( y & ), is partly determined by the effectiveness of the financial system in delivering governance (G) 
and capital allocation functions (A).  Decomposing output growth ( y & ), as in equation (2), into input 
growth (I & ), and productivity improvements ( P F T & ), it has been shown (e.g. Levine and Zervos 
(1998)) that financial development works through productivity improvements in affecting growth.  
Productivity improvements ( P F T & ), however, may result from shifts in the underlying technology or 
improvements in the efficiency of the production process. Thus, denoting T & to be technological 
change andE & to be changes in efficiency,    8 
(3)     E T P F T & & & + =          
I argue that while the degree to which the financial system provides governance (G) affects the rate 
of improvements in the relative efficiency (E & ) with which the firm utilizes its resources, the 
allocation function (A) has an impact on the rate of technological change (T & ).  In so doing, I trace 
the specific channels through which the financial system influences economic performance.  My 
conceptual model is, therefore,    
) , ( G A E Φ = &         
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  Allocation (A) could also have an impact on efficiency, as governance (G) on technological 
change (T & ).  However, the directions of the relations do not appear to be obvious a priori.  For 
example, in an environment of capital abundance vis a vis investment opportunities, increased 
capital mobilization (A), may lead to over-investment, suggesting a negative relation between 
allocation (A) and efficiency (E & ).  Similarly, whether better governed (via markets or otherwise) 
firms experience faster technical change is an empirical question. While the direct route from 
governance to technical change may not be obvious, Allen (1993) suggests a possible indirect link 
whereby financial market’s role as information aggregator (part of governance) could be more 
useful to industries with complex decision environments, such as those characterized by rapid 
technological change.  Thus, one would expect a positive correlation between technological change 
and the measure of governance, but this link does not indicate causation.     9 
III.  Data and Measurement of Proxies 
To estimate the measures of economic performance, I use industry-level production data for 
ten manufacturing industries over the period 1980 to 1995 for thirty-eight countries from the United 
Nations Industrial Statistics database.  I use financial development indicators to construct measures 
of the allocation and governance functions of the financial system.  These include stock market 
capitalization, value traded and turnover ratio obtained from Emerging Markets Fact-book (various 
issues) published by the World Bank, and size of domestic credit and size of the private credit 
sector from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the IMF.  The stock market data 
is available on a systematic manner since 1980, thus limiting the study period.  
A.  Measurement of Capital Market Functions 
 
Ideally, one would like to have a measure of the ability of firms to raise capital to meet their 
financial needs and to benefit from the related governance services provided by financial systems. I 
use measures of financial system size as proxies for the capital mobilization (allocation) function 
and measures of financial market activity as proxies for the governance function.   
The allocation function represents the ability of a country’s financial system to mobilize 
capital and enable participants to pool and share risk.  The larger, broader, and deeper a country’s 
financial system, the more effectively it mobilizes capital and distribute financial risk. Hence, I use 
the sizes of a country’s equity and credit markets relative to its GDP as broad indicators of the 
allocation function.  In so doing, I follow Levine and Zervos (1998), La Porta et al (1997) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) which use the size as measures of financial development.  The size of 
equity markets is represented by stock market capitalization to GDP ratio (MKTCAP).  The size of 
the credit sector is measured, alternatively, by (a) the size of total domestic credit relative to GDP 
(BANK), and (b) the size of total credit to the private sector relative to GDP (PRIVATE). While   10 
BANK is a broader indicator of the depth of the credit sector, PRIVATE is a tighter measure of the 
ability of the intermediary sector in mobilizing capital to the private sector. As such, conditional on 
finding relations, PRIVATE is expected to have a larger coefficient. 
As a broad indicator of the degree of governance services provided by a country’s financial 
system, I use a measure of the country’s stock market activity for which I use the ratio of total value 
of equity traded to stock market capitalization – turnover ratio (TURNOVER).   Alternatively, for 
robustness, I use the degree of accounting disclosure, which reflects the extent of information flow 
and ease of monitoring.  
There are strong theoretical reasons for using TURNOVER as a measure of the governance 
function.  First, greater market liquidity implies more and better information—prices reflect 
information about the firm and its investment prospects more accurately.  Increased market activity 
induces more information-acquisition, which, in turn, increases the information content of stock 
prices (see Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)).  The more shares of stock actively being traded and the 
more liquid the market, the easier it becomes for an informed party to make a good return on 
investment (Kyle (1984)).  The resultant increased information flow into the market improves the 
information content of stock prices.  Hence, a measure of market liquidity is an indicator of the 
degree of “information aggregation”. 
Second, informative security prices in liquid markets facilitate the monitoring
2 of 
management, as well as the implementation of incentive-based compensation designed to align 
management’s interests with those of shareholders.  Incentive contracts in the form of managerial 
option and equity related compensations are useful for reducing agency costs only to the extent that 
the underlying equity prices are informative of firm performance. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) 
show how liquidity via increased informativeness of security prices enhances monitoring. 
                                                           
2 Effective monitoring and control could be exercised through other mechanisms such as via intermediaries and board effectiveness,   11 
Third, greater liquidity makes it easier for active shareholders to build positions so as to bring 
about changes in corporate policies. Bhide (1993) argues that more liquidity implies less 
monitoring, since shareholders can dispose easily of positions if they disagree with management’s 
policies.  On the other hand, Maug (1998) shows that the benefits to shareholders from building 
positions and inducing good governance is so significant that the impact of greater market liquidity 
on effective monitoring is unambiguously positive.  
Finally, the effective use of the secondary equity markets for corporate-control activities 
requires that the market be liquid.  Takeovers require a liquid capital market—a market where 
bidders can access a vast amount of capital on short notice.  Therefore, with liquid markets, 
investors who want to acquire a firm can do so.  
Market liquidity as a measure of governance applies only to stock markets.  Banks also 
provide governance services both as information producers and delegated monitors. However, the 
opaqueness of banks’ dealings with their borrowers makes it difficult to construct a comparable 
proxy for governance. Ideally, one would like to have cross-country differences in loan rejections, 
corporate restructurings, board actions, and other governance activities initiated by banks to 
represent bank monitoring.   The cross-country differences in the size of the banking sector 
(measured, alternatively, by the variables BANK and PRIVATE) may pick up some of the 
differences in banking governance role.  However, while the size directly mirrors the ability of the 
sector to mobilize capital, size does not translate into good governance. Recent failures in corporate 
governance from Japan to Southeast Asia despite large banking sectors provide a counter example.  
Similarly, it should be noted that differences in the size of the stock market across countries as 
measured by MKTCAP might contain information about differences in governance. Yet, size again 
does not directly translate into good governance. A large market with many listed companies that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
which may not be captured by our proxy for governance.   12 
rarely trade, as is the case in many emerging economies, does little to generate information and 
facilitate monitoring.   
Table 1 presents a summary of the measures of capital market functions.  Panel (a) shows 
averages of the variables over the period of 1980-1995 for each country.   We observe a number of 
patterns.  First, there is a wide variation.  For example, Germany has a turnover ratio of 1.0394 vis a 
vis Bangladesh’s 0.0327. Second, stock market size does not necessarily correspond with stock 
market activity. For example, Chile has a relatively large stock market (MKTCAP 0.4717) and yet 
is one of the thinnest, with turnover of 0.0661.  On the other hand, Turkey has one of the smallest 
markets (MKTCAP equals 0.0624) and is relatively busy (TURNOVER 0.5041). Third, by all 
measures, developed countries have more advanced financial systems than emerging countries. The 
correlations (in Table 2) between the log of real per capita income and proxy variables are 
significantly positive.  
If we divide the countries into developed and emerging using International Finance 
Corporation’s classification, the distribution of countries along the spectrum of the financial 
variables is highly skewed in favor of developed economies.  For example, 32% of emerging and 
0% of developed countries fall in the lowest quartile of TURNOVER; and over 40% of emerging 
and only 5% of developed economies fall in the bottom quartile of MKTCAP.  45% of emerging 
and 0% of developed economies belong to the bottom quartile on BANK.  In contrast, only 9% of 
emerging and 43 % of the advanced markets falls in the top quartile of MKTCAP. 
B.  Measurement of Economic Performance 
 
    An aggregate index of improvement in an economic unit, extensively used in the literature, 
is the growth rate in some measure of output.  My measure of aggregate performance is GV, the 
annual compounded growth rate in real value-added. GV is an empirical equivalent of ( y & ) in   13 
equation (1). Output growth could be a result of either growth in the component factors of 
production or improvements in productivity.  My second measure of aggregate performance is GP, 
the annual compounded growth rate in total factor productivity. GP operationalizes  P F T &  in 
equation (2) above. Furthermore, productivity gains in economic activities could be caused by two 
different factors: adoption of technological innovations in products and processes (measured by the 
rate of technological change), and improvements in efficiency which reflects the capacity of insider 
decision-makers to improve production, given inputs and available technology.  
I define efficiency as the degree to which the firm’s observed attainment converges to its 
optimal behavioral goal, under conditions of technological and market constraints. I operationalize 
my sense of efficiency using Farrell’s (1957) concept of production efficiency and Leibenstein’s 
(1966) economic efficiency.  Production efficiency reflects the degree to which a producer achieves 
the maximum attainable quantity of output for a given bundle of inputs.  The optimum is in terms of 
production possibilities and, as such, efficiency is defined in reference to the technical relations 
between observed and attainable quantities.  
The optimum can also be defined in terms of some behavioral goal the producer is assumed 
to pursue, such as cost minimization or profit maximization.  Efficiency then refers to the degree to 
which that assumed objective is achieved.  In the cost minimization framework, an empirical 
measure of efficiency would be the ratio of the minimum attainable cost for a given level of output 
to the actual cost incurred by the producer.  This is what is called economic efficiency.  A firm can 
achieve production efficiency by obtaining the maximum output for whatever bundle of inputs it 
chooses to employ.  It may yet be inefficient if it purchases what is not the best bundle of inputs 
given the input prices and their marginal productivities in production.  This latter concept of 
efficiency is called “price efficiency”.   Economic efficiency subsumes both production and price 
efficiencies.    14 
Improvements in firm’s productivity are not the result of efficiency gains alone.  They may 
arise from adoption of technological innovations in processes and products that enable the firm to 
achieve higher production quantities with lower input usage or equivalently the same level of output 
at lower costs.   While efficiency reflects managerial actions in reference to a behavioral goal, this 
source of productivity reflects both the state of the available technology and the ability of firms to 
acquire new technologies in their production processes.  
Empirically, I measure production efficiency based on a stochastic production frontier, in 
which efficiency is calculated as the proportion of actual output to the maximally attainable one.  
The closer is the actual to the optimal level of output, the more efficient the firm is.  The empirical 
measure of growth in efficiency thus estimated is ∆PRODEFF, the annual rate of improvements in 
production efficiency. ∆PRODEFF is one of the empirical proxies of growth in efficiency,E & , in 
equation (4) above. I measure economic efficiency based on a stochastic cost frontier as the 
proportion of the minimum attainable cost to actual cost.  The resultant variable is ∆ECONEFF, the 
annual rate of economic efficiency, and serves as the alternative empirical proxy for E &  in equation 
(4). I measure the effect of technical progress as the shift in the production frontier over time 
holding input quantities at the same level, and the resulting variable, TC, the annual rate of 
technological change, is my empirical proxy for T & in equation (4). 
Appendix 1 provides the details on the estimation of these variables.  Tables 1 and 2 provide 
a summary.  From Panel (a) of Table 1, there is wide variation in the estimates across countries.  
Growth is slower in advanced countries than in emerging economies, as would be expected, 
reflecting initial conditions. The growth rate in real value added (GV) is strongly negatively 
correlated with per capita real GDP in Table 2. On the other hand, productivity growth (GP) is not 
related to countries’ level of economic development. Productivity growth in the U.S. (3.1%) 
compares well with that of the Philippines (3.3%), the highest being registered by industries in   15 
Korea (4.9%) and in Sri Lanka (5.4%).  More importantly, the growth rates in efficiency 
(∆ECONEF and ∆PRODEFF) are not related to countries’ level of economic development. The 
growth rates in economic efficiency and in production efficiencies range from 0.93% and 0.54% in 
Korea to –0.74% in Bangladesh and -0.87% in Peru respectively.  Yet, an advanced country like the 
U.S. (0.11%) could have realized growth in economic efficiency comparable to that for Chile 
(0.09%) and Colombia (0.09%). Industries in richer countries realize higher rates of technological 
change (TC).  TC is positively correlated with per capita GDP (Table 2). This might be a reflection 
of the fact that richer countries do have the wherewithal to support advance R&D activities, which 
keeps them on the technological lead. 
IV. Market-Based  Governance,  Allocation, and Economic Performance 
 
Panel (c) of Table 1 summarizes both the capital market function variables and the 
economic performance variables for the entire sample of 3605 industry-country-years.  There are 
wide variations in realized performance measures. The median industry growth rate in real value 
added is 2.6% for the entire sample. The growth rate in economic efficiency has a median value of 
0.032%, with a range from -21.5% to 26.8%.  The median growth rate in production efficiency is 
0.008% with a range of –20.1% to 29.1%.   The rate of technological change averages at 1.9% per 
annum. The average industry contributes about 5% of the manufacturing sectors’ total real value 
added or real output.    
These variations in performance appear to be closely associated with variations in the 
measures of capital market functions across countries. Table 3 explores the relations between the 
two sets of variables further by presenting difference-of-means test of the performance measures 
across sub-samples formed on the basis of rankings in the finance variables.  From panel (a), more 
active equity markets are strongly associated with higher growth rates in value added, productivity   16 
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and efficiency. On the other hand, the size of equity markets is weakly related to growth rates in 
value added, productivity, and efficiency (see panel (b)). Better allocation by the credit sector is 
strongly related to productivity gains, and technical change (panel (c) and (d)).  
A.  Financial System Functions and Aggregate Measures of Performance 
 
I begin the analysis of the relations between financial systems and economic performance, 
by examining the link between capital market functions and aggregate measures of industry 
performance.  This would facilitate a comparison with the extant literature. I use the growth rates in 
real value added, and productivity as measures of how well off an industry is. My empirical model 
is a four-way error component (random effects) of the following form:   
(5)      ∑ + + =
k cit ct
k
ct
k
cit Z F GV ε γ β       
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cit Z F GP ε γ β        
where,  GVcit  and GPcit  are, respectively, the annual compounded growth rates of real value-added 
and total factor productivity of industry i in country c over period t.  c=1,…,C; i=1,…,Ic ; and, 
t=1,…,Tci.   Fct
 k is the kth financial function indicator variable for country c in period t.  The 
financial function variables are TURNOVER, MKTCAP, BANK and PRIVATE.  The control 
variable Zct represents the relative significance of industry i in country c during period t.  I use the 
share of value added of the industry in the total value added of the manufacturing sector of the 
country (SHARE).  The model is a four-way error-component (random effects) specification with 
the following error structure:    
 
(7)      
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αc, ηi, λt  and νcit are independent from each other and also independent of the F and Z variables in 
Equations (5) and (6) above. αc is unobservable time and industry invariant, country specific 
effects; ηi is unobservable country and time invariant, industry effects; λt represents unobservable 
country and industry invariant, time effects; and, νcit is a random disturbance term. 
 Hence, I control for country, industry and time heterogeneity, thereby avoiding the risk of 
bias in our estimates
3.  Moreover, I treat these latent country, industry and time effects as random 
variables rather than fixed parameters
4. I estimate the model by the method of maximum likelihood 
(ML) under the distributional assumption of normality for the error components and the residual.  
The ML estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient, and have a known asymptotic 
sampling information matrix
5. 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the empirical model.  From Panel (a), the results indicate a 
very strong relation between the degree to which capital markets perform their governance 
functions and industry aggregate performance.  The coefficient estimates of TURNOVER – the 
proxy for the governance function - is positive (0.0570) and statistically significant at 1%.  
Moreover, the contributions of these services are economically significant.  For example, using the 
coefficient estimates, a one standard deviation increase in TURNOVER (0.294) would increase the 
growth rate in real value added of the average industry by about 1.68% per annum
6. 
                                                           
3 The model rests on the premise that a sensible representation of relations among variables of interest across diverse countries, 
industries and time-periods cannot explicitly capture all important variables.  These variables could be simply too many to be 
included, since some may be un-measurable and others unobservable.  
4For robustness, I also estimate the models in this section and the sections that follow as fixed effects specifications. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the ones under the error-components specification.  
5Alternative estimation methods that include ANOVA type, ML, restricted maximum likelihood (REML), and Minimum Quadratic 
Unbiased Estimation (MINQUE) vary in the way the variances of the error components are estimated.  Simple ANOVA type 
estimates no longer apply for unbalanced panel with three error-components.  I use REML, a procedure in which variance 
components are estimated based on the portion of the likelihood function that depends on the error components alone.  In a balanced 
data, the REML estimators of the variance components are identical to ANOVA estimators, which have optimal minimum variance 
properties.  The results do not change when we estimate the models by ML, and by MINQUE procedures. 
6 This is calculated by multiplying the coefficient estimate for TURNOVER from Table 4 (i.e. 0.0570) by the standard 
deviation of TURNOVER from Table 1 (i.e. 0.294).   18 
While stock market size (MKTCAP) is not significant, the variables BANK and PRIVATE 
(proxies for the allocation function of credit markets) are positive and statistically significant. The 
larger coefficient on PRIVATE reflects the fact that the variable is a tighter measure of capital 
mobilization to the private sector.  A one standard deviation increase in the size of domestic credit 
(BANK) would increase the growth rate in real value added of the average industry by 2.32% per 
annum, the same order of magnitude as the estimates of the effect of bank development on per 
capita GDP (2.52%) in Levine (1998).   Note, however, that a one standard deviation (0.329) 
increase is approximately the difference in size of domestic credit between India and the United 
States.  
Industries that account for a larger portion of the country’s manufacturing have higher 
growth rates. This may be a reflection of the effects of other sources of comparative advantage (i.e. 
other than the financial system). Developed countries have lower growth rates (the coefficient of 
log per capita GDP (not reported) is significantly negative) reflecting the convergence effect
7. With 
respect to the latent variables, overall, the country, industry and time effects are significant in 
explaining variations in industry growth (all error components are statistically significant).   
Unobservable country factors appear to be relatively more important than the others.  For example, 
based on model I, the sum of variances of the error components associated with country, industry, 
time and the noise term amount to 0.0340. Country, industry and time effects account for about 
10% (i.e. 0.0033) of the total unexplained variations in industry growth, out of which country-
specific (but industry and time invariant) factors account for more than 50% (i.e. 0.0018).     
  Panel (b) presents the relations between capital market functions and growth in real gross 
output (instead of value added). The results are qualitatively similar to the value-added regressions.  
                                                           
7 The results here and in the sections to follow are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of these variables.   19 
Table 5 presents the relations between productivity growth, which is an amalgam of 
technological change and efficiency gains, and capital market functions.  TURNOVER - the 
governance proxy - has a statistically positive relation with productivity growth.  On the other 
hand, while productivity growth is significantly related to the size of the credit sector (BANK and 
PRIVATE), it is not related to stock market capitalization (MKTCAP). This is consistent with 
Levine and Zervos (1998). The productivity consequences of the governance and allocation 
proxies are economically very significant. To illustrate, consider Mexico which has an average 
turnover of 0.5394 (Table 1) and a productivity growth of 0.9% (Table 1). Using our estimates in 
model I, if Mexico were able to increase market activity by a mere 10% of the present level, it 
would increase its rate of productivity growth of the average industry to about 0.12% per annum.   
Including the proxies in combination (models V through XII), TURNOVER carries a strong 
positive coefficient, whereas the allocation proxies (BANK and PRIVATE) lose their significance. 
In impacting productivity growth, the governance function dominates the allocation role. In models 
VI, VIII and X, TURNOVER was interacted with MKTCAP, BANK and PRIVATE respectively 
to assess if the productivity impact of stock market governance depends on the relative importance 
of the credit sector vis a vis the stock market in capital provision. The interaction terms for BANK 
and PRIVATE are negative and significant. The marginal productivity effect of market-based 
governance is lower in countries where the credit sector is dominant in capital provision. This 
might be because in such economies, much of the governance is undertaken by the credit sector as 
well. To the extent that there are overlaps in the governance services provided through the two 
media, the more important is the credit sector as a conduit of capital, the lower would be the 
marginal benefit of stock market monitoring. 
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B.  Governance and Economic Performance: The Efficiency Channel 
 
  Productivity growth is an amalgam of effects of technological innovations and 
improvements in efficiency.  This section explores in detail the impact of capital market functions 
on efficiency growth. My hypothesis is that financial markets through their information aggregation 
and monitoring function induce economic efficiency within the firm. I use a four-way error 
components (random effects) model of the following form: 
(8) 
(9) 
where ∆ECONEFF is the growth rate in the economic efficiency of industry i of country c in period 
t; and ∆PRODEFF is the growth rate in the production efficiency of industry i of country c in period 
t.  Fct
k is the kth financial function variable for country c in period t. The finance function variables 
are TURNOVER, MKTCAP, BANK and PRIVATE.  The model is a four way random-effects 
model with random country, industry, time effects as specified in equation (7) above. 
Table 6 reports a very strong association between the degree to which capital markets 
perform their governance functions and improvements in industry economic efficiency 
(∆ECONEFF).  In model I, TURNOVER – the governance proxy - enters with a positive 
coefficient that is statistically different from zero.  The relation between MKTCAP and efficiency, 
while positive, lacks statistical significance (model II), as does the relation between the size of the 
credit sector (BANK and PRIVATE) and efficiency (models III and IV).  
Higher TURNOVER is also accompanied by larger efficiency improvements on the margin 
after controlling for the other financial proxies. In model V, TURNOVER is positive (0.0057) and 
significant at 1% level, while MKTCAP is not different from zero. Similarly, in Models VII and IX, 
which includes the proxies for capital mobilization by the credit sector, TURNOVER is positive 
(0.0063 and 0.0062) and significant at 1%.  The coefficients on the other variables fall sharply and   21 
remain statistically insignificant. Models VIII and X where TURNOVER is interacted with BANK 
and PRIVATE, the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating again that the marginal 
efficiency effect of market-based governance is lower in countries where the credit sector is the 
dominant medium for capital provision. Finally, in model XI, which include BANK and MKTCAP, 
the governance proxy, is robustly positive (0.0060, significant at 1%); and none of the other 
variables are marginally significant. The same result holds when we use PRIVATE in model XII.  
Thus, controlling for the allocation services of both stock markets and the credit sector, the proxy 
for the governance function of markets adds value to efficiency growth.  
  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the information aggregation and 
monitoring function of markets determines the relative efficiency with which firms utilize 
resources.  Increases in my proxy for the governance function raise industry efficiency after 
controlling for unobservable country, industry and time effects and other services provided by the 
financial sector.  The contributions of these services to industry economic efficiency are 
economically large.  For example, using the coefficient estimates in model I, a one standard 
deviation increase in the proxy for the governance function (0.294) would increase the growth rate 
in economic efficiency of the average industry by about 0.18% per annum. Accumulating over the 
15 years of the sample period, the average industry would have been about 3% more efficient by the 
end of the study period, compared to the actual fifteen years median of 0.032 percent.  
  The results based on growth in production efficiency (∆PRODEFF), the alternative measure 
of efficiency, are presented in Table 7. In the individual regressions, TURNOVER again has a 
relatively large and positive effect on production efficiency (0.004 and significant at 1%). 
MKTCAP has no effect on production efficiency.  On the other hand, BANK and PRIVATE have 
positive and significant coefficients in the individual regressions; but they lose significance once 
turnover is controlled for. The results from models V to XII are similar to the results on economic   22 
efficiency (∆ECONEFF) in Table 6. 
  In light of the structural differences between developed and emerging countries discussed in 
section III (A) above, I estimate equations (8) and (9) on the sub samples of developed and 
emerging countries separately. The results (not reported) are qualitatively similar to Table 6 and 7 
for the total sample. TURNOVER is positively correlated with ∆ECONEFF and none of the size 
variables enter the regressions with statistical significance. Raising TURNOVER also increases 
∆PRODEFF in both sub-samples, while raising the size variables does not affect ∆PRODEFF. The 
consistency of the results across the sub-groups provides additional robustness. 
C.  Allocation and Economic Performance:  The Technological Change Channel   
Productivity growth is made up of efficiency improvements and technological change. This 
section explores in detail the impact of capital market functions on technological change. My 
hypothesis is that the financial system through its allocation function enables firms to adopt 
technological innovations and inventions. 
Table 8 presents the results in which I regress industry technological changes (TC) on 
proxies of the governance and allocation functions.  In the individual regressions, TURNOVER 
fails to be statistically significant.  MKTCAP enters positively but is significant only at 10%. On 
the other hand, both BANK and PRIVATE, my measures of the allocation function by credit 
markets, carry statistically significant positive coefficients, indicating a strong relation between the 
degree to which the supporting financial system provides allocation services and the rate of 
technological change attainable by industries. Raising the size of domestic credit (BANK) by one 
standard deviation (0.329) increases the rate of technical change of the average industry by about 
0.07 percent per annum (double the effect of MKTCAP).    23 
In version V, where MKTCAP appears with TURNOVER, both variables enter positively 
but both fail to be significant.  In models VI and VII, where TURNOVER and MKTCAP are 
included respectively besides BANK, TURNOVER and MKTCAP fail to be significant while 
BANK is robustly positive (0.0025 and 0.0026).  Increasing the size of domestic credit raises the 
rate of technological change even after controlling for effects of equity markets.  Similarly, the 
coefficients of PRIVATE are significantly positive in models VIII and IX.   Finally, in models X 
and XI, where both TURNOVER and MKTCAP appear in addition to BANK and PRIVATE 
respectively, only the credit market variables (BANK and PRIVATE) remain statistically 
significant. Controlling for the governance and allocation services of the equity market, increasing 
allocation by the credit sector increases the rate of technical change. 
Industries that account for a larger portion of the country’s manufacturing realize higher 
technical change. This may be a reflection of the effects of other sources of comparative advantage.    
Also, not surprisingly, industries in developed countries achieve higher rate of technical change.  
Given the differences between developed and emerging countries discussed in section III 
(A) above, I estimate the model on the sub samples of developed and emerging countries 
separately. Again the results (not reported) are qualitatively similar to those on Table 8 for the total 
sample. Increasing BANK or PRIVATE – the proxies for Allocation – increases technological 
change in both sub samples, whereas TURNOVER and MKTCAP do not explain variation in 
technological change.  As would be expected, the impact of mobilization in emerging markets 
appears to be larger than that in developed countries.  While statistically significant, the coefficients 
for BANK and PRIVATE in emerging markets (0.0048 and 0.0087) are larger than those for the 
developed countries (0.0019 and 0.0020 respectively).  
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypotheses.  First, industries that are supported 
by financial systems with greater capital mobilization ability exhibit faster rates of technological   24 
change. This is true even after controlling for the governance function of the capital markets. 
Second, in its role as capital mobilizer, the credit sector appears to have stronger and larger impact 
on technological change than stock markets. The effects of BANK and PRIVATE on technological 
change remain significantly positive even in models that include MKTCAP. Third, the role of 
markets as providers of governance appears to have little impact on technical change.  TURNOVER 
invariably fails to explain differences in technological change.  
V. Robustness 
A.  Accounting Disclosure and Efficiency 
 
I use market turnover as my main proxy for information production and monitoring. An 
alternative way to measure the degree of information flow in a capital market is to look at the 
accounting standards that determine the amount and quality of disclosure by firms trading in the 
market.  I have an index of accounting reporting quality for different countries developed by the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research.  The index rates the annual reports of at 
least three companies in each country based on the inclusion or omission of 90 reportable items.  
The sample of companies used in each country is designed to represent a cross-section of 
representative industries. The index could be viewed as a measure of the degree of sophistication 
and efficiency of the capital market in processing information.  Also, more disclosure as measured 
by the index indicates the availability of public information that might be associated with some of 
the governance functions of markets we intend to measure. The index ranges from 0 to 90, the 
higher score indicating more mandated public disclosure.  For our sample (I have the index only for 
31 countries), the range is from 24 to 83, the lowest registered by Egypt and the highest by Sweden.  
The US scores 71 on this index.  More developed countries have higher accounting standards 
(correlation with log per capita GDP is 0.56); yet, there are exceptions. The U.S. (score 71),   25 
Norway (74) and Canada (74), Australia (75), score less than that of Malaysia (78); whereas 
Philippines (65), and Mexico (60) score as high as Italy (65), Japan (62) and Germany (62). 
  Table 9 presents the results using this index, instead of TURNOVER, as a proxy for 
governance. Governance as measured by the index of accounting quality is strongly related with 
improvements in economic as well as production efficiency.  The coefficient estimates of the 
accounting quality index in panel (a) and in panel (b) are positive (around 0.0001) and statistically 
significant at 5%).   On the other hand, the index is not important in explaining differences in 
technological change (panel (c)).  The index is also positive and significant on the margin in models 
II through VI in which we control for the capital mobilization proxies.  Thus, after controlling for 
capital provision in equity market (models II and model V) and in credit markets (models III, IV, V 
and VI), higher accounting standard quality is related to larger gains in efficiency.  Also, consistent 
with the earlier results, none of the proxies for allocation appear to be associated with efficiency 
gains. Thus, market-based governance is strongly related to firm efficiency, whether governance is 
measured in terms of level of market activity or in terms of quality of accounting disclosure. 
B.  Causality Issues 
 
So far, I examined the association between economic performance and the degree to which 
capital markets discharge governance and allocation services.  I measure the latter using variables 
that I assume to be exogenous and predetermined.  It may be argued that our proxies for capital 
market functions are not exogenous enough in that capital market development may simply be “a 
leading indicator rather than a causal factor”.   In an attempt to isolate the exogenous component of 
capital market functions, Table 10 uses two sets of variables as instruments.  These are indices of 
investor-protecting legal codes, and country of legal origin.  La Porta et al (1997) argues that legal 
protections and country’s legal origin determine financial development and that these, in turn, are   26 
primarily determined by a country’s colonial history. Hence, the two sets of variables would be 
ideal instruments for capital market functions in that while the variables are strongly correlated with 
our proxies, they do not directly correlate with economic performance.  Levine and Zervos (1998) 
use these variables as instruments for financial development. 
  In Model I of Table 10, the component of TURNOVER predetermined by the extent of legal 
protection afforded to investors has a positive, statistically large impact on growth in economic 
efficiency (Panel (a)), and on growth in production efficiency (Panel (b)). The exogenous 
component of the governance proxy is robustly positively related to growth in economic and 
production efficiency on the margin after controlling for stock market size, and the size of the credit 
sector. Similarly, the size of the credit sector predetermined by the extent of legal protection is 
strongly related to technical change (Panel (c)). In Model II, the component of the governance 
proxy predetermined by legal origin has a significant positive impact on growth in economic 
efficiency (Panel (a)), and on growth in production efficiency (Panel (b)), as does the allocation 
proxy on the rate of technical change (Panel (c)). Hence, the relations between governance and 
efficiency, and allocation and technological change identified so far are less likely to be explained 
by endogeneity.   
VI.     Conclusion 
I examine the causal relations between capital market functions and firms’ real economic 
performance focusing on the governance roles of capital markets.  I begin from a premise that 
financial markets and institutions play two critical roles in an economy: allocation of risk capital 
through saving mobilization and risk-pooling and sharing (the allocation function); and promotion 
of responsible governance and control through providing outside investors a variety of mechanisms 
for monitoring inside decision makers (the governance function). The paper argues that the two   27 
functions systematically affect different sources of growth.  Specifically, I argue that the 
governance services contribute to improvements in the relative efficiency with which the firm 
utilizes its resources, while the allocation function allows firms to adopt new and costly 
technologies. In so doing, I trace the mechanisms through which financial development influences 
economic growth. 
Based on industry level data for ten manufacturing industries across thirty-eight countries 
over the period 1980-1995, I find evidence consistent with these hypotheses.  First, I find that both 
governance and allocation are significant determinants of real output growth and productivity.  
Second, I report that the impact of governance on productivity dominates the impact of allocation. 
Third, I find that while governance works through the channel of improving economic efficiency to 
promote productivity, the allocation function affects the technological change component of 
productivity.  
The finding of a strong association between economic performance and the effectiveness of 
financial markets suggests the importance of financial development as a policy for accelerating 
economic growth.  It provides evidence that financial sector policies that promote financial 
market’s functional capacities lead to better real economic performance.  It points out the 
incompleteness of traditional development strategies that exclusively focus on real-sector reforms 
to induce economic development.    
Furthermore, through linking the multiple functions of the financial system to the primal 
sources of economic performance, the study underscores the importance of a functional perspective 
in guiding financial sector policies.   The study documents that the different functions of the 
financial system play distinct roles in the economic growth process.  In particular, the governance 
function promotes economic efficiency.  The depth of the financial infrastructure of an economy 
has to be judged in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency with which it delivers these multiple   28 
functions.   A mere launching of financial markets and institutions is not sufficient for accelerating 
growth; what also matters is their efficient functioning.   
The prevailing policy discussions of financial systems, particularly in developing countries, 
have focused on their role in mobilizing savings for industrialization.  Such emphasis on the capital 
provision role was inevitable given the dominant economic thinking on the subject, the McKinnon-
Shaw (see, McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw, 1973) paradigm, which views the financial system as a 
mere conduit of capital provision.  In this study, based on a corporate-finance paradigm, I attempt 
to show the shortcomings of such a policy perspective by providing evidence that the value of 
financial markets lies in their governance services that are distinct from capital mobilization.  29 
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Table 1 
Financial Function Proxy Variables and Measures of Economic Performance: Averages over the 
period 1980-1995. 
  Turnover Ratio 
 
 
 
(TURNOVER) 
Stock 
Market 
Cap./GDP 
 
(MKTCAP) 
Domestic 
Credit/GDP 
 
 
(BANK) 
Private 
Credit/GDP
 
 
(PRIVATE)
Growth 
in Real 
Value 
Added 
(GV) 
Growth in 
Productivity
 
 
(PG) 
Growth in 
Economic 
Efficiency 
 
(∆ECONEFF) 
Growth in 
Production 
Efficiency 
 
(∆PRODEFF) 
Technical 
Change 
 
 
(TC) 
Industry Share 
in 
Manufacturing 
 
(SHARE) 
Log(Per 
Capita GDP) 
 
Panel (a):  Summary by Country 
Australia  0.2923  0.4712 0.6133 0.4930  0.008  0.020  0.0003  -0.0000  0.023  0.043  9.704 
Austria  0.4422  0.0783 1.1361 0.8656  0.019  0.028  0.0017  0.0007  0.023  0.038  9.856 
Bangladesh  0.0327  0.0158 0.2976 0.1732  0.045  -0.064  -0.0074  0.0000  -0.011  0.034  5.234 
Belgium  0.1202  0.2767 0.9036 0.3970  -0.001  0.003  -0.0008  -0.0015  0.027  0.032  9.791 
Canada  0.3084  0.4687 0.5763 0.5021  0.030  0.019  -0.0001  -0.0000  0.024  0.029  9.899 
Chile  0.0661  0.4717 0.7692 0.5848  0.053  0.038  0.0048  0.0120  0.012  0.026  6.086 
Colombia  0.0863  0.0725 0.2091 0.1587  0.039  0.011  0.0009  0.0021  0.014  0.061  7.711 
Denmark  0.2086  0.2386 0.5974 0.4461  0.029  0.018  0.0009  0.0014  0.020  0.050  7.096 
Egypt  0.0636  0.0442 0.9532 0.2618  0.029  0.013  -0.0002  0.0002  0.015  0.061  10.085 
Finland  0.2019  0.1936 0.7882 0.7063  0.000  0.021  0.0016  0.0005  0.020  0.042  10.081 
Germany  1.0394  0.1995 1.1282 0.8856  0.025  0.022  0.0003  -0.0002  0.033  0.045  9.963 
Greece  0.1218  0.0881 0.7134 0.2482  0.022  0.038  0.0022  0.0018  0.017  0.054  8.968 
India  0.4261  0.1460 0.5075 0.2602  0.089  0.027  0.0040  0.0043  0.015  0.051  5.780 
Indonesia  0.1855  0.0669 0.2557 0.2655  0.171  0.030  0.0033  0.0050  0.007  0.040  6.315 
Israel  0.6492  0.3208 1.2850 0.6854  -0.019  -0.013  -0.0039  -0.0027  0.014  0.037  9.287 
Italy  0.2986  0.1285 0.7939 0.3591  -0.015  -0.018  -0.0031  -0.0027  0.028  0.051  9.757 
Japan  0.4329  0.7859 1.2702 1.0759  0.042  0.018  0.0002  -0.0003  0.036  0.046  9.966 
Jordan  0.1571  0.5552 0.8809 0.6056  0.008  -0.021  -0.0049  -0.0045  0.022  0.123  7.008 
Korea  0.8502  0.2710 0.5470 0.5155  0.113  0.049  0.0093  0.0054  0.022  0.055  8.527 
Kuwait  0.2363  0.5051 0.6614 0.6219  0.030  0.007  -0.0018  0.0015  0.000  0.026  9.632 
Malaysia  0.2392  1.2054 0.7274 0.6362  0.108  0.019  0.0000  0.0016  0.016  0.043  7.730 
Mexico  0.5394  0.1551 0.3576 0.1958  0.021  0.009  -0.0015  -0.0006  0.016  0.055  7.975 
Netherlands  0.3656  0.4485 0.9683 0.7700  0.017  0.016  0.0002  -0.0002  0.025  0.057  9.786 
New  Zealand  0.1854  0.4242 0.5030 0.4306  -0.016  0.009  -0.0004  -0.0008  0.015  0.068  9.444 
Norway  0.3265  0.1624 0.6211 0.5155  -0.002  0.024  0.0011  0.0000  0.021  0.043  10.179 
Pakistan  0.1413  0.0945 0.5135 0.2771  0.075  -0.029  -0.0025  0.0005  0.006  0.043  5.794 
Peru  0.1630  0.0649 0.1606 0.1020  -0.118  -0.049  -0.0110  -0.0087  0.019  0.051  7.524 
Philippines  0.2161  0.2419 0.3489 0.2544  0.017  0.033  0.0004  0.0017  0.010  0.058  6.566 
Portugal  0.1537  0.0968 0.9816 0.5543  0.013  0.022  0.0024  0.0009  0.022  0.048  8.690 
Singapore  0.3254  1.3511 0.7614 0.7564  0.040  0.012  0.0008  0.0003  0.013  0.037  9.422 
Spain  0.2695  0.1966 0.9965 0.6928  0.011  0.013  -0.0028  -0.0019  0.025  0.045  6.496 
Sri  Lanka  0.0694  0.1333 0.4171 0.2138  0.155  0.054  0.0002  0.0003  -0.005  0.079  9.344 
Sweden  0.2984  0.4141 0.7613 0.4552  0.008  0.018  0.0001  0.0001  0.021  0.040  10.123 
Turkey  0.5041  0.0624 0.3672 0.1894  0.054  0.028  0.0019  0.0014  0.018  0.046  7.880 
U.  K.  0.3783  0.8100 0.8814 0.7901  0.002  0.021  -0.0051  -0.0006  0.030  0.044  6.984 
U.S.  0.5379  0.6273 0.8337 0.6891  0.033  0.031  0.0010  0.0002  0.035  0.039  9.654 
Venezuela  0.1275  0.0717 0.2965 0.2271  -0.005  -0.005  0.0011  0.0004  0.024  0.047  9.949 
Zimbabwe  0.0653  0.1705 0.2849 0.1286  0.027  -0.032  -0.0053  -0.0037  0.004  0.071  7.876 
Panel (b):  Summary by Industry 
 
Food Products          (ISIC 311)     0.036 0.012  -0.0008  0.0000  0.022  0.116     
Beverages                (ISIC 313)     0.041 0.023  0.0010  0.0014  0.023  0.041     
Tobacco                   (ISIC 314)     0.014 0.014  0.0012  0.0005  0.019  0.028     
Textiles                    (ISIC 321)     -0.003 0.011  -0.0011  -0.0008  0.021  0.056     
Wearing Apparel     (ISIC 322)     0.037 0.013  0.0003  0.0010  0.008  0.029     
Industrial Chemicals(ISIC351)     0.041 0.030  0.0012  0.0011  0.026  0.050     
Rubber Products       (ISIC355)     0.006 0.006  -0.0010  -0.0008  0.017  0.015     
Plastic Products        (ISIC 356)     0.062 0.015  0.0000  0.0011  0.014  0.021     
Iron and Steel           (ISIC 371)      -0.008  0.014  -0.0008  -0.0007  0.026  0.041     
Machinery, except Electrical  (ISIC 382)      0.043  0.016  -0.0001  0.0010  0.016  0.067   
Panel (c):  Summary of Overall Sample 
 
 
No. of 
observations 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Dev. 
Minimum 
Maximum 
3420 
 
0.282 
0.210 
0.294 
0.005 
2.000 
3203 
 
0.272 
0.140 
0.345 
0.001 
3.500 
3558 
 
0.668 
0.640 
0.329 
0.078 
2.300 
3558 
 
0.476 
0.440 
0.279 
0.021 
1.7600 
3301 
 
0.027 
0.026 
0.205 
-0.976 
0.960 
3272 
 
0.015 
0.016 
0.180 
-1.076 
0.950 
3261 
 
-0.0001 
0.00032 
0.026 
-0.215 
0.268 
3272 
 
0.00035 
0.00008 
0.022 
-0.201 
0.291 
3577 
 
0.019 
0.019 
0.013 
-0.029 
0.056 
3508 
 
0.047 
0.031 
0.044 
0.001 
0.326 
38 
 
8.477 
9.344 
1.527 
5.234 
10.179 
Turnover Ratio is total market value of equity traded during the year relative to total stock market capitalization at the end of the year.  Stock Market Capitalization 
to GDP is total market value of publicly traded equity at end of year as reported by IFC divided by the Gross Domestic Product of that year. Domestic credit to GDP 
ratio is the sum of assets held by the monetary authority and depository institutions excluding inter-bank deposits (i.e. IFS lines 32a-32f excluding 32e) divided by 
GDP.  The ratio of private credit to GDP is the proportion of claims against the private sector (IFS line 32d) divided by GDP.  Growth in real value added is the 
annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-eight countries over the period 1980 to 1995. Productivity and 
efficiency are computed based on parameter estimates of cross-country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of industry production and cost data.  
Production efficiency is a Farrell (1957) output related measure of efficiency which measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the efficient production 
frontier.  Economic efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier. Technological change measures the shift in the 
production frontier over time, and represents increases in real output (or decrease in total cost) due to adoption of better technology. Industry Share in Manufacturing 
is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country.   32 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
  
 Turnover 
Ratio 
 
 
(TURNOVER) 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
 
 
(MKTCAP) 
Domestic 
Credit 
 
 
(BANK) 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector 
 
(PRIVATE) 
Growth 
in Real 
Value 
Added 
(GV) 
Growth in 
Productivity 
 
 
(PG) 
Growth in 
Production 
Efficiency 
 
(∆PRODEFF) 
Growth in 
Economic 
Efficiency 
 
(∆ECONEFF) 
Technical 
Change 
 
 
(TC) 
Industry Share 
in 
Manufacturing 
 
(SHARE) 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 
0.186
 ***                 
Domestic credit 
(BANK) 
 
0.249
***  0.242
 ***               
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
 
0.328
***  0.517
***  0.774
 ***             
Growth in Real Value 
Added 
(GV) 
 
0.120
 *** 0.008  0.004  0.043             
Growth in Productivity 
(PG) 
 
0.115
 *** 0.033  0.085
 ** 0.083
 ** 0.901
***          
Growth in Production 
Efficiency 
(∆PRODEFF) 
 
0.083
 ** 0.040  0.046  0.060  0.899
***  0.937
***       
Growth in Economic 
Efficiency 
(∆ECONEFF) 
 
0.140
 ***  0.011 0.049  0.074  0.740
***  0.831
 ***  0.895
***      
Technical Change 
(TC) 
 
0.357
***  0.255
 *** 0.465
***  0.487
***  -0.125
***  0.006
  -0.089
 ** 0.037     
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
 
-0.031 -0.071  -0.061  -0.108
** 0.063  0.008  0.052  0.048  -0.028   
Per capita GDP  0.236
***  0.308
***  0.500
***  0.609
***  -0.145
***  0.033 -0.050  0.043  0.650
***  -0.270
 *** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   33
Table 3 
Inter-Quartile Mean Differences in Industry Performance 
 
Bottom 25% vs Top 25% 
 
Variables  Bottom                    Middle              Top 
     25%                         50%                    25%  Wilcoxon Test  T test 
 
Panel (a): Ranking by Stock Market Turnover Ratio 
0.0240 
0.0330 
0.0073 
-0.0002 
-0.0025 
0.0133 
0.0176 
0.0150 
0.0128 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0204 
0.0468 
0.0443 
0.0268 
0.0013 
0.0020 
0.0246 
Panel (b): Ranking by Market Capitalization 
0.0237 
0.0307 
0.0096 
-0.0006 
-0.0030 
0.0134 
0.0282 
0.0257 
0.0209 
0.001 
0.0013 
0.0203 
0.0334 
0.0303 
0.0141 
-0.00006 
0.0004 
0.0250 
Panel (c):  Ranking by Domestic Credit to GDP 
 
 
 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Growth in  Real Gross Output 
Growth in Productivity 
Growth in Production Efficiency 
Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Technical Change 
 
 
 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Growth in  Real Gross Output 
Growth in Productivity 
Growth in  Production Efficiency 
Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Technical Change 
 
 
 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Growth in  Real Gross Output  
Growth in Productivity 
Growth in Production Efficiency 
Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Technical Change 
 
0.0268 
0.0254 
0.0085 
-0.0003 
-0.0021 
0.00118 
0.0287 
0.0287 
0.0151 
0.0007 
0.0009 
0.0195 
0.0315 
0.0313 
0.0256 
0.0009 
0.0002 
0.0252 
 
 
 
-3.48
*** 
1.87
* 
-3.77
*** 
-2.81
*** 
-4.21
*** 
-18.51
*** 
 
 
 
-1.85
* 
-0.29 
-1.62 
-1.05 
-2.54
** 
16.05
*** 
 
 
 
-0.24 
0.41 
-2.82
*** 
-1.21 
-2.57
*** 
20.5
*** 
 
 
 
 
-2.28
** 
-1.42 
-2.12
** 
-1.37 
-3.17
*** 
-20.7
*** 
 
 
 
-0.89 
0.05 
-0.46 
-0.43 
-2.28
** 
-18.04
*** 
 
 
 
-0.41 
-0.64 
-1.67
* 
-1.05 
-1.59 
-23.1
*** 
 
      
 
Panel (d): Ranking by Credit to Private Credit to GDP 
0.0396 
0.0376 
0.0166 
0.0013 
-0.0008 
0.0108 
0.0240 
0.0249 
0.0155 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0207 
0.0261 
0.0260 
0.0164 
0.0003 
-0.0001 
0.0240 
 
Panel  (e):  Ranking by average per capita GDP 
 
 
 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Growth in  Real Gross Output 
Growth in Productivity 
Growth in Production Efficiency 
Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Technical Change 
 
 
 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Growth in  Real Gross Output 
Growth in Productivity 
Growth in  Production Efficiency 
Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Technical Change 
0.0427 
0.0416 
0.0086 
0.0008 
-0.0015 
0.0097 
0.0230 
0.0253 
0.0131 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0198 
0.0209 
0.0159 
0.0232 
0.0002 
0.0007 
0.0262 
 
 
 
 
 
2.40
** 
2.72
*** 
-0.46 
1.14 
0.11 
19.77
*** 
 
 
 
2.89
*** 
4.77
*** 
-3.23
*** 
-1.04 
-2.22
** 
-26.4
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
1.19 
1.19 
0.02 
0.80 
-0.53 
-21.9
*** 
 
 
 
2.05
** 
2.97
*** 
-1.51 
0.52 
-1.40 
-31.6
*** 
 
Sample is classified into quartiles based on stock market turnover ratio, market capitalization, domestic credit, credit to 
private sector and average per capita GDP respectively over the period 1980-1995. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares 
of stock traded divided by market capitalization.  Stock Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total market value of publicly 
traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets held by the monetary authority and depository institutions 
excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector divided by 
GDP. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   34
Table 4 
Aggregate Performance and Capital Market Functions 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Panel (a) 
Growth in Real Value Added 
Panel (b) 
Growth in Real Gross Output 
Independent 
Variables 
I II  III  IV    I  II  III IV   
Turnover  
Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
 
0.0570
*** 
(0.015) 
      0.0358
*** 
(0.012) 
      
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 0.0161 
(0.016) 
       0.0100 
(0.013) 
    
Domestic  
Credit 
(BANK) 
   0.0706
*** 
(0.021)
 
       0.0854
*** 
(0.018) 
  
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
     0.0940
*** 
(0.024) 
       0.1049
*** 
(0.021) 
 
Industry’s Share 
in Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
0.6178
*** 
(0.097) 
0.6008
*** 
(0.098) 
0.6159
*** 
(0.102) 
0.6187
*** 
(0.102) 
  0.3830
*** 
(0.081) 
0.3718
*** 
(0.080) 
0.4085
*** 
(0.087) 
0.4106
*** 
(0.087) 
 
Error Components 
σα
2 
ση
2  
σλ
2 
σν
2 
 
0.0018
*** 
0.0007
* 
0.0008
** 
0.0307
*** 
 
0.0013
*** 
0.0007
* 
0.0009
** 
0.0317
*** 
 
0.0020
*** 
0.0006
* 
0.0009
** 
0.0365
*** 
 
0.0015
*** 
0.0006
* 
0.0009
** 
0.0366
*** 
   
0.0014
*** 
0.0005
* 
0.0006
** 
0.0215
*** 
 
0.0011
*** 
0.0004
* 
0.0007
** 
0.0213
*** 
 
0.0019
*** 
0.0004
* 
0.0005
** 
0.0263
*** 
 
0.0015
*** 
0.0004
* 
0.0006
** 
0.0263
*** 
 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time effects. The 
dependent variables are the annual compound growth rate in the real value added and the annual compound growth rate in the real gross output for each of the ten 
industries over thirty-eight countries for the period 1980-1995. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares of stocks traded divided by market capitalization. Stock 
Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets held by the monetary authority 
and depository institutions excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector divided by GDP.  
Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the 
country. Coefficients of the intercept are not reported. Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.   35
Table 5 
Productivity Growth and Capital Market Functions 
Variable 
 
I  II III  IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII 
Turnover  
Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0389
*** 
(0.011) 
   0 . 0 3 4 4
*** 
(0.010) 
0.0393
*** 
(0.014)
 
0.0385
*** 
(0.012) 
0.1073
*** 
(0.027) 
0.0393
*** 
(0.012) 
0.0933
*** 
(0.025) 
0.0348
*** 
(0.010) 
0.0335
*** 
(0.011) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 -0.0077 
(0.010) 
  -0.0087 
(0.009) 
-0.0020 
(0.015) 
    - 0 . 0 0 8 7  
(0.009) 
-0.0090 
(0.010) 
Domestic  
Credit 
(BANK) 
  0.0267
** 
(0.012)
 
   - 0 . 0 0 1 6
 
(0.013) 
0.0218 
(0.015) 
  -0.0093
 
(0.011) 
 
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
   0 . 0 4 2 6
*** 
(0.015) 
    - 0 . 0 0 7 9
 
(0.017) 
0.0222 
(0.020) 
 -0.0007
 
(0.016) 
Interaction       -0.0190 
(0.034) 
 -0.079
*** 
(0.028) 
 -0.0934
** 
(0.038) 
  
Industry’s Share 
in Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
0.2431
*** 
(0.072) 
0.2458
*** 
(0.073) 
0.2486
*** 
(0.072) 
0.2619
*** 
(0.073) 
0.2230
*** 
(0.071) 
0.2245
*** 
(0.071)
 
0.2539
*** 
(0.072) 
0.2495
*** 
(0.071) 
0.2525
*** 
(0.072) 
0.2562
*** 
(0.072) 
0.2281
*** 
(0.069) 
0.2290
*** 
(0.070) 
Error Components 
σα
2 
ση
2  
σλ
2 
σν
2 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0267
*** 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0272
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0009
** 
0.0300
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0009
** 
0.0300
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0007
** 
0.0258
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0007
** 
0.0258
*** 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0266
*** 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0266
*** 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0266
*** 
 
0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0008
** 
0.0266
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0007
** 
0.0257
*** 
 
<0.0001
 
<0.0001
 
0.0007
** 
0.0257
*** 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time effects.  The dependent 
variable is the annual growth in total factor productivity for each of the ten industries over thirty-eight countries for the period 1980-1995. Economic efficiency is in 
terms of deviation of actual cost to the optimal minimum cost on a stochastic cost frontier. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares of stocks traded divided by market 
capitalization.  Stock Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets held by the 
monetary authority and depository institutions excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector divided by 
GDP.   The variable Interaction represents the product of the two other variables in the respective model.  Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the 
real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the intercept are not reported.  Asymptotic 
standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   36
Table 6 
Growth in Economic Efficiency and Capital Market Functions 
Variable 
 
I  II III  IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII 
Turnover  
Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0061
*** 
(0.002) 
   0 . 0 0 5 7
*** 
(0.002) 
0.0077
*** 
(0.002)
 
0.0063
*** 
(0.002) 
0.0181
*** 
(0.004) 
0.0062
*** 
(0.002) 
0.0152
*** 
(0.004) 
0.0060
*** 
(0.002) 
0.0057
*** 
(0.002) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 0.0003 
(0.002) 
  -0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0026 
(0.002) 
    - 0 . 0 0 0 1  
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
Domestic  
Credit 
(BANK) 
  0.0015
 
(0.002)
 
   - 0 . 0 0 2 0
 
(0.002) 
0.0021 
(0.002) 
  -0.0023
 
(0.002) 
 
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
   0 . 0 0 3 8
 
(0.002) 
    - 0 . 0 0 1 3
 
(0.003) 
0.0038 
(0.003) 
 -0.0005
 
(0.003) 
Interaction       -0.0077 
(0.005) 
 -0.014
*** 
(0.004) 
 -
0.0154
*** 
(0.006) 
  
Industry’s Share 
in Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
0.0236
** 
(0.011) 
0.0243
** 
(0.011) 
0.0283
** 
(0.011) 
0.0289
** 
(0.011) 
0.0221
** 
(0.011) 
0.0226
** 
(0.011)
 
0.0256
*** 
(0.011) 
0.0251
** 
(0.011) 
0.0255
** 
(0.011) 
0.0260
** 
(0.011) 
0.0244
*** 
(0.011) 
0.0245
*** 
(0.011) 
Error Components 
σα
2 
ση
2  
σλ
2 
σν
2 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0006
*** 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time effects.  The dependent 
variable is the annual compound growth rate in economic efficiency for each of the ten industries over thirty-eight countries for the period 1980-1995. Economic 
efficiency is in terms of deviation of actual cost from the optimal minimum cost on a stochastic cost frontier. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares of stocks traded 
divided by market capitalization.  Stock Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets 
held by the monetary authority and depository institutions excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector 
divided by GDP.   The variable Interaction represents the product of the two other variables in the respective model.  Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by 
dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the intercept are not reported.  
Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   37
Table 7 
Growth in Production Efficiency and Capital Market Functions 
Variable 
 
I  II III  IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII 
Turnover  
Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0040
*** 
(0.001) 
   0 . 0 0 3 5
*** 
(0.001) 
0.0047
*** 
(0.002)
 
0.0040
*** 
(0.001) 
0.0120
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0041
*** 
(0.001) 
0.0099
*** 
(0.004) 
0.0036
*** 
(0.001) 
0.0034
*** 
(0.001) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 0.00002 
(0.001) 
  -0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0014 
(0.002) 
    - 0 . 0 0 0 3  
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
Domestic  
Credit 
(BANK) 
  0.0028
* 
(0.002)
 
   - 0 . 0 0 0 7
 
(0.002) 
0.0020 
(0.002) 
  -0.0007
 
(0.001) 
 
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
   0 . 0 0 4 1
** 
(0.002) 
    - 0 . 0 0 1 4
 
(0.002) 
0.0018 
(0.003) 
 0.0008
 
(0.002) 
Interaction       -0.0045 
(0.004) 
 -0.009
*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.0098
** 
(0.005) 
  
Industry’s Share 
in Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
0.0166
** 
(0.008) 
0.0177
** 
(0.008) 
0.0204
** 
(0.009) 
0.0215
** 
(0.009) 
0.0147
** 
(0.008) 
0.0149
** 
(0.008)
 
0.0180
** 
(0.008) 
0.0180
** 
(0.008) 
0.0178
** 
(0.008) 
0.0183
** 
(0.008) 
0.0162
** 
(0.008) 
0.0164
** 
(0.008) 
Error Components 
σα
2 
ση
2  
σλ
2 
σν
2 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
 
<0.001
* 
<0.001
 
<0.001
** 
0.0004
*** 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time effects.  The dependent 
variable is the annual compound growth rate in production efficiency for each of the ten industries over thirty-eight countries for the period 1980-1995. Production 
efficiency is in terms of deviation of actual output from the optimal maximum output on a stochastic production frontier. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares of 
stocks traded divided by market capitalization.  Stock Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the 
sum of assets held by the monetary authority and depository institutions excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the 
private sector divided by GDP.   The variable Interaction represents the product of the two other variables in the respective model.  Industry Share in Manufacturing is 
calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the intercept are not 
reported.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8 
Technological Change and Capital Market Functions 
Variable 
  I 
II  III  IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX  X  XI 
Turnover  
Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
    0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
  0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
 0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
0.0007
 
(0.0005) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
 0.0010
* 
(0.0006) 
   0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0008 
(0.006) 
   0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
Domestic  
Credit 
(BANK) 
  0.0020
*** 
(0.0007)
 
   0.0025
*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0026
*** 
(0.0008) 
  0.0024
*** 
(0.0008) 
 
Credit to Private 
Sector 
(PRIVATE) 
   0 . 0 0 2 3
*** 
(0.0008) 
     0.0034
*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0030
*** 
(0.0010) 
 0.0030
*** 
(0.0010) 
Industry’s Share in 
Manufacturing 
(SHARE) 
0.0671
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0667
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0660
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0660
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0671
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0671
*** 
(0.003)
 
0.0674
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0674
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0671
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0674
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0674
*** 
(0.003) 
Error Components 
σα
2 
ση
2  
σλ
2 
σν
2 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
 
<0.001
*** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
** 
<0.001
*** 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time effects.  The dependent 
variable is the rate of technological change, computed based on estimate of the production frontier, for each of the ten industries over thirty-eight countries for the 
period 1980-1995. Turnover Ratio is the value of total shares of stocks traded divided by market capitalization.  Stock Market Capitalization is the ratio of the total 
market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets held by the monetary authority and depository institutions excluding inter-bank 
transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector divided by GDP.   The variable Interaction represents the product of the two 
other variables in the respective model.  Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output 
of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the intercept are not reported.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. . *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   39
Table 9 
Accounting Disclosure and Economic Performance 
Variables  I II  III  IV  V  VI 
Panel (a): Dependent Variable:  Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Accounting Standard Quality 
(x100) 
0.0113
** 
(0.005) 
0.0099
** 
(0.005) 
0.0108
** 
(0.005) 
0.0113
** 
(0.005) 
0.0093
* 
(0.005) 
0.0100
** 
(0.005) 
Market Capitalization (x100) 
(MKTCAP) 
 -0.0854 
(0.152) 
   -0.0727 
(0.160) 
-0.1162 
(0.166) 
Domestic Credit (x100) 
(BANK) 
   -0.0715 
(0.199) 
 -0.0755 
(0.183) 
 
Credit to Private Sector (x100) 
(PRIVATE) 
    -0.0031 
(0.249) 
 0.0981 
(0.239) 
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing (x100) 
(SHARE) 
1.883
* 
(0.989) 
1.849
* 
(1.000) 
2.023
** 
(0.997) 
2.032
** 
(0.997) 
1.995
** 
(1.008) 
2.017
** 
(1.008) 
Panel (b): Dependent Variable:  Growth in Production Efficiency 
Accounting Standard Quality 
(x100) 
0.0086
** 
(0.004) 
0.0069
** 
(0.003) 
0.0092
** 
(0.004) 
0.0084
** 
(0.004) 
0.0079
** 
(0.003) 
0.0073
** 
(0.003) 
Market Capitalization (x100) 
(MKTCAP) 
 -0.0787 
(0.107) 
   -0.1012 
(0.111) 
-0.1373 
(0.118) 
Domestic Credit (x100) 
(BANK) 
   0.0970 
(0.047) 
 0.0888 
(0.0125) 
 
Credit to Private Sector (x100) 
(PRIVATE) 
    0.0720 
(0.186) 
 0.1844 
(0.169) 
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing (x100) 
(SHARE) 
1.671
** 
(0.759) 
1.607
** 
(0.762) 
1.785
** 
(0.765) 
1.782
** 
(0.765) 
1.728
** 
(0.767) 
1.745
** 
(0.768) 
Panel (c):  Dependent Variable: Technological Change 
Accounting Standard Quality 
(x100) 
-0.0075 
(0.009) 
-0.0087 
(0.009) 
-0.0061 
(0.009) 
-0.0081 
(0.009) 
-0.0073 
(0.009) 
-0.0090 
(0.009) 
Market Capitalization (x100) 
(MKTCAP) 
 0.1137
* 
(0.059) 
   0.0991 
(0.060) 
0.0959 
(0.061) 
Domestic Credit (x100) 
(BANK) 
  0.219
*** 
(0.080) 
 0.1840
** 
(0.085) 
 
Credit to Private Sector (x100) 
(PRIVATE) 
   0.2710
*** 
(0.097) 
 0.2208
** 
(0.104) 
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing (x100) 
(SHARE) 
7.104
*** 
(0.323) 
7.154
*** 
(0.341) 
7.123
*** 
(0.325) 
7.121
*** 
(0.325) 
7.170
*** 
(0.342) 
7.167
*** 
(0.342) 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random country, industry and time 
effects.  Accounting standard quality is an index of the quality of company financial disclosure across countries.   Stock Market Capitalization is 
the ratio of the total market value of publicly traded equity to GDP. Domestic Credit is the sum of assets held by the monetary authority and 
depository institutions excluding inter-bank transfer divided by GDP.  Credit to Private Sector equals claims against the private sector divided by 
GDP. Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the 
manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the intercept are not reported.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   40
 
Table 10 
Capital Market Functions and Economic Performance: Instrumental 
Variables 
Variables  I II 
Panel (a):  Dependent Variable:  Growth in Economic Efficiency 
Turnover Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0187
*** 
(0.007) 
0.0171
** 
(0.009) 
Market Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
0.0008 
(0.004) 
-0.0030 
(0.004) 
Domestic Credit 
(BANK) 
0.0081 
(0.006) 
-0.0099 
(0.009) 
    
    
 
Panel (b):  Dependent Variable:  Growth in Production Efficiency 
Turnover Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
0.0105
** 
(0.005) 
0.0149
* 
(0.008) 
Market Capitalization 
(MKTCAP 
0.0018 
(0.003) 
-0.0019 
(0.003) 
Domestic Credit 
(BANK) 
0.0079 
(0.005) 
-0.0108 
(0.008) 
    
    
Panel ( c): Dependent Variable: Technological Change 
 
Turnover Ratio 
(TURNOVER) 
Market Capitalization 
(MKTCAP) 
Domestic Credit 
(BANK) 
 
0.0096
  
(0.012) 
0.0179
 * 
(0.010) 
0.0371
 *** 
(0.009) 
0.0112 
(0.008) 
-0.0019
 
(0.005) 
0.0241
*** 
(0.008) 
The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of four-way error component models containing random 
country, industry and time effects.  In Model I, the instruments are index of shareholder’s legal rights provided in 
the country’s legal codes, index of legal rights protecting debt holders, judicial efficiency and an index of rule of law 
from La Porta et al (1998).  In Model II, the instruments are the origin of a country’s legal system.  The legal origin 
variables include dummy variables for “English origin”, “French origin”, “German origin”, and “Scandinavian 
origin” from La Porta et al (1998). Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the 
industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country.  Coefficients of the 
intercept are not reported.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Decomposition of Productivity into Efficiency and Technical Change   
 
  I assume that there exists an unobservable function, a production frontier, representing 
the maximum attainable output level for a given combination of inputs.  I represent these best-
practice production technologies by a translog production function of the form
8, 
(1A) 
      
     
      
xci
j(t) and xci
k(t) are production inputs j and k used in industry i of country c during period t.  The 
production inputs are capital (K) and labor (L).  The variable t, an index of time, represents the 
level of technology.  µci(t) is a one-sided random variable and measures the degree of 
inefficiency of  industry i of country c in period t.  The specification is a random-effects model 
in which latent country and industry effects are specified as random variables. αc and ηi are the 
random unobservable country-specific and industry-specific effects respectively, and νci(t) is the 
usual white noise. The distributional assumptions on the error components are: 
(1B) 
         
 
From eq. (1A), the estimate of the rate of technological change (TC) for industry i in country c 
for period t is given by, 
(1C) 
                                                           
8 Mychoice of this particular functional form is dictated by its flexibility reducing the chance of inferring inefficiency when in 
fact the problem is a poor fit to the data of a more restrictive form.  Moreover, there is evidence that manufacturing production is 
non-homothetic and exhibits scale economies, both of which are accommodated in the translog form.   42
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Using the predicted value of the inefficiency term (µci(t)) from eq. 1A, the level of 
production efficiency of industry i of country c during period t is:  
(1D) 
PRODEFF represents the ratio of actual output to the maximum attainable output if the industry 
were efficient, holding the technology (i.e. the production frontier) and the level of input usage 
constant.  Its value ranges from 0 to 1(i.e.100% efficient).  Growth in production efficiency 
(∆PRODEFF) for industry i in country c over period (t) is then given by,  
 
(1E) 
 
This estimate using the production function framework measures only production 
efficiency.  It does not account for the possible error of the firm in choosing an appropriate input 
mix given relative prices (i.e. price inefficiency).  I estimate an economic efficiency score that 
reflects both production and price efficiencies based on the dual stochastic cost frontier
9 
10.  After 
estimating a translog cost function analogous to eq. (1A), the level of economic efficiency for 
industry i, in country c, and in period t is:  
(1F) 
where θci(t) is a one-sided random variable denoting the degree of economic inefficiency.  Eq. 
(1F) is the ratio of the minimum cost on the frontier to actual cost incurred and ranges in value 
from 0 (inefficient) to 100% (efficient).  Growth in economic efficiency (∆ECONEFF) is then 
given by,  
( 1 G )       
                                                           
9 A cost function maps cost-minimizing points where relative prices are set to equal marginal productivities.  This is a result of an 
optimization problem in which the firm minimizes cost (choosing input levels) subject to the technological constraints 
represented by the production function.  Thus, a production unit on the cost frontier is both technically and allocatively efficient.  
The deviation of actual cost from the cost frontier, holding output level and input prices constant, would naturally measure the 
amount of total economic inefficiency.  
10Duality theory suggests that under certain regularity conditions, if producers pursue cost minimizing objective, the production 
function can be uniquely represented by a dual cost function.    
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